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Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
AT RICHMOND 
J. S. ·EATON, 
vs. 
HENRIETTA V, DAVIS. 
To the Honorable Judges of the Supreme Court of Appeals of 
Virginia: 
Your petitioner, J. S. Eaton, respectfully represents: 
_ That your petitioner is aggrieved by a decree of the Circuit 
Court of Rockingham County, Virginia, entered on July 20, 1939, 
in the above entitled chancery cause then f)ending in said Court, in 
which cause your petitioner was complainant and Henrietta V~ 
Davis was respondent, the object of said suit being the reduction of 
the alimony decreed Henrietta V. Davis, formerly Henrietta V. 
Eaton, by the decree of July 25, 1929, in above entitled cause re-
ferred to. 
A transcript of the record in said cause accompanies this petition. 
ST A TEMENT OF THE CASE. 
By a decree entered on July 2S, 1929, on the petition· of J. S. 
Eaton in the divorce suit of Henrietta V. Eaton vs. I. S. Eaton, 
the said Henrietta V. Davis, she having re-taken her maiden name, 
was awarded alimony in the sum of $50.00 per month, yay-
2* able on the *first day of each month. See "Ex. Decree," 
(R. pp. 5-7). . 
At the time said decree was entered, to-wit, July 25, 1929, the 
right to thereafter modify said decree in a case such as this was·· 
dependent upon the reservation of such right in the decree. The 
reservation of the right to modify said decree was denied your_ 
petitioner ( R. p. 6). The Legislature of Virginia in ~ 938 amended 
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Section 5111 by adding immediately after the words "any alimony" 
the following: "that may thereafter accrue whether the same has 
been heretofore or hereafter awarded." 
Said amendment to said Section 5111 gives the right to either 
party to apply for the enlargement or reduction of alimony when-
ever the same may have been awarded, and thus said section was 
made retroactive. 
Said amendment became effective June 21, 1938, and your 
petitioner· instituted this suit to the First August Rules, 1938, and 
in said suit your petitioner prayed that said alimony might be drasti-
cally reduced, because he was broken in health and finances, as in 
said petition more specifically alleged.· 
The said Henrietta V. Davis duly filed her answer and demurrer 
to said petition, the principal ground of said demurrer being that 
said amendment to said Section 5111 was unconstitutional in that 
it permitted the revision of said decree of July 25, 1929, wherein 
she was awarded alimony as aforesaid. 
By a decree entered in said cause on July 20, 1939, said 
3* *amendment, as to its retroactive provision, was held un-
constitutional, and your petitioner's suit was dismissed. Said 
decree of July 20, 1939, is the decree from which your petitioner 
appeals. 
THE QUESTION INVOLVED IN THIS APPEAL. 
The question involved in this petjtion is the constitutionality of 
the retroactive provision of the said 1938 amendment to Section 
5111. 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS. 
The Court erred in decreeing that the retroactive provision of 
said 1938 amendment to Section 5111 was unconstitutional, and in 
dismissing the above e_ntitled cause. 
ARGUMENT. 
The demurrer in the above entitled cause of course ·admits, for 
the purposes of the demurrer, the facts sufficiently pleaded in the 
hi!l of complaint. Those facts clearly show that the present ali.mony 
allowance of $50.00 per month is now grossly inequitable to your 
petitioner. The Court's attention is hereby directed to the bill of 
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complaint in this cause for the details in regard to this feature of 
the case. 
WHEN WILL A COURT DECLARE A ST A TUTE 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL? 
A Court will not declare a statute unconstitutional unless driven 
so to do. · 
In the recent case of Carroll vs. Hutchinson, Va., 200 
4* S. E. 644, the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Holt, 
says: 
"Always it will be remembered that statutes are not 
to be declared unconstitutional unless courts are driven 
to that conclusion." 
It follows that said amendment to said Section 5111 is prima 
facie constitutional, and that the burden is upon the appellee to drive 
the Court to hold said statute unconstitutional. 
In this connection, it is to he noted that all divorce proceedings, 
including the allowance of alimony, are based upon statutes. 1n· • 
the recent case of Bailey vs. Bailey, - Va.; - 200 S. E. 622, Chief 
Justice Campbell, at Page 623, said : -
"The juridiction of a court of equity in divorce cases 
in this Commonwealth depends solely upon statute." 
and at Page 624, in ref erring to Section 5111 of the Code, said· 
"The statute is a remedial one and should be construed 
liberally in order to effectuate the plain intention of the 
legislature to empower courts of equity to discharge· the 
function of a guardian in the protection of rights and 
interests of infant defendants." 
It is true the retroactive feature of the statute was not involved 
in that case, and that it was dealing with the rights of 
5* *infants, but said case nevertheless shows very clearly that 
the Court considered Section 5111 as a remedial statute/ and 
that the same should, therefore, be liberally construed. 
A very pertinent question here to be considered is whether or 
not there is power enough in the Commonwealth of Virginia to 
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readjust· unaccrued and future installments of alimony and modify 
the allowance theretofore made when the former allowance appears 
to be grossly inequitable by reason of the changed conditions of the 
parties. 
It is to he noted from the decisions hereinafter cited that the 
right to contract or to deal with unaccrued alimony, or future 
installments of alimony, is hedged about by restrictions which are 
incident to the welfare of the person for whose benefit the award 
was made and to the welfare of society in general. It is believed 
that the Commonwealth has sufficient reserve police power, when 
authorized by the Legislature to exercise the same to re-consider 
the amount of unaccrued alimony theretofore decreed. By analogy, 
the Commonwealth has the same sort of reserve police power that it 
has in rate-making cases, as is clearly stated in the case of the City 
of Richnwnd vs. Virginia Railway and Power Conipany, - Va.-; 
126 S. E. 353. In that case, the Court, quoting from the Atlantic 
Coast Line R.R. Co. vs. Goldsboro, 232 U.S. 548, said: 
"For it is settled that neither the 'contract' clause nor 
the 'due process' clause has the effect of overriding the 
power of the state to establish all regulations that are 
6* · reasonably necessary to secure the *health, safety, good 
order, comfort, or general welfare of the community; 
that this power can neither be abrogated nor bargained 
away, and is inalienable even by express grant; and that 
all contract and property rights are held subject to its fair 
exercise." 
The Virginia cases cited in the opinion of the lower court were 
all decided prior to the 1938 amendment to said Section 5111. It 
is very plain that none of those cases involved any question as to 
the power of the Legislature to enact the section of the Code on 
this subject as it now stands. They decided what the law then was, 
but did not attempt to decide anything as to the power of the Legis-
lature to change the law from time to time and make it what it now 
is. The Legislature now has supplied what was found to be want-
ing in· those cases. It has con £erred power to modify an allowance 
of alimony in all cases, and it has not yet been decided that such an 
act Violated the Constitution. 
THE APPROACH TO THE SOLUTION OF THE 
QUESTION AT ISSUE. 
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The proper approach to the solution of the qJ.testion at issue is to 
first determine whether or not the uhaccrued or future installments 
of alimony, awarded under a final
0 
decree, are property within the 
meaning of the due process clause of the Constitution, or whether 
such unaccrued or future installments of alimony are merely per-
sonal rights. "The Court's attention is called to the fact that it is not 
the finality of the decree awarding alimony that is decisive of the 
question at issue, but the character of the a ward under such 
7* decree, that is, whether the same is prop*erty within the 
protection of the Constitution. 
WHAT ARE THE ATTRIBUTES OF PROPERTY. WITHIN 
THE MEANING OF THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE? 
In 50 C. J., Page 779, Section 54, under the head of Incidents of 
Ownership, the author says : 
"The chief incidents of the ownership of property are 
the rights to its possession, use, and enjoyment, and to 
sell or otherwise dispose of it according to the will of the 
owner, .......... " 
In note 10, sub-section (a), on the same page, it is stated : 
"Test of ownership is the right of di~position." 
In 6 Words and Phrases, First Series, at Page 5698, the author 
defines the word property, and cites a great number of cases, and I 
shall only quote from some of the more pertinent definitions: 
"Webster defines property to be exclusive right of pos-
sessing, enjoying, and disposing of a thing"; r ·; .. ~--
, 
"The right of property includes the power to dispose 
of it according to the will of the owner." 
"Property, in its broader sense, is not the physical thing 
which may be the subject of ownership, but is the right 
of dominion, possession, and power of disposition which 
may be acquired over it." 
~-( .. 1. 
"There is no definition of property which does not in-
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elude the power of disposition and sale as well as the 
right of private use' ~nd enjoyment. Indeed, if any one 
can define property eliminated of its attributes, incapab~e 
·of sale and place, without the protection of the law, it 
were well that the attempt be made." 
8* *In 3 Words and Phrases, Second Series, Page 1278, the 
author says: 
"According to the approved definitions, property in-
cludes power of disposition and sale, as well as the right 
of private use and enjoyment.'' 
In 6 Words and Phrases, Third Series, at Page 243, property is 
defined as follows : 
· "Within Const. U. S. Amend. 14, protecting life, lib-
erty~ and property from invasion without due process of 
law, property is more than the mere thing which a person 
ownes and includes the right to acquire, use, and dispose 
of it, and these essential attributes of property are pro-
tected by the Constitution. Buchanan v. Warley (Ky.) 
245 U. S. 60 .......... " (Underscoring mine.) 
In 3 Words and Phrases, Fourth Series, Page 220, the author 
makes the following statement : · 
"Alimony decreed as definite sum monthly payable to 
divorced wife, and tinpaid, held not property ar debt 
within garnishment statute; hence not subject to garnish-
ment by judgment creditor of wife ......... " 
In the case of Nickell vs. Handly, 10 Gratt., at Page 345, the 
Court says: 
"Property has legal incidents, of which it cannot be 
divested, . . . . . . . . . . . . ; one of these inddents is its 
liability to the debts of its owner." 
I 
In the case of W. T. Pity vs.· 'J,V. W. Phy (Oregon), 42 A. L. R 
588, the Court, at Page 595, holds: 
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"The award made by the decree is not a duty due the 
wife, but is maintenance prescribed and defined by law. 
See opinion of Mr. Justice Pitney in Lynde vs. Lynde, 69 
N. J. Eq. 736. . . . . . . . . 52 Atl. 694--wherein the 
eminent jurist held that a wife's claim to permanent ali .. 
mony is a personal right and not a property right" 
9* *In a note on Page 179 of 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) the follow-
ing quotations from the decision of Lynde vs. Lynde may be 
found, namely : · 
"An examination into the history of the allowance of 
alimony, and the nature and uses of alimony, will demon .. 
strate that a claim for such an allowance is far different 
from the right of property. It is not a right to recover 
damages or compensation for injury to property or per-
son, or for deprivation of property; nor is it a claim for 
1 a property interest in a share of the husband's estate. 
Alimony, in its origin, was the method by which spiritual 
courts of England enforced the duty of support, owed by 
the husband to the wife, during such time as they were 
legally separated during the marriage relation. It foi-
lows, as a necessary consequence of what has been said, 
that a wife's claim for an allowance of alimony is · a 
purely personal. right, and not in any sense a property 
right. It is in its nature not susceptible of ·assignment by 
the wife to another nor capable of enjoyment by her in 
anticipation." 
In the case of Frances L. Fournier vs. Jonathan L. Glutton, 
7 L. R. A. (N. S.), at Page 186, the Court says: 
"The reason why a wife is denied the right to assign an 
award of alimony intended by law for her maintenance is 
not stated, but it is obvious. It is that she may not, by the 
,exercise of that right, frustrate the purpose of the law. 
That ·the principal object for which the law awards ali-
mony is the maintenance of the· wife, or of the wife and 
children, is clear." 
In the West Virginia case of Smith vs. Smit~, 95 ·S. E. 199, the 
Court, at Page 201, says: 
10 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
"An overwhelming weight of authority, however, 
makes a decree for alimony more than a mere decree for 
payment of money ........ It is a personal order to the 
husband, similar to an order of court to one of the officers 
or to an attorney ........ And the order is not, there-
! ore, a debt, within the meaning of the constitution. 
. . . . The decree is for maintenance, not for money." 
(Underscoring mine.) 
10* *The case of Livingston vs. Livingston, 173 N. Y. 377; 
66 N. E. 123, which case was decided in 1903, is the leading 
case on the particular question now under consideration. 
That case was decided by a divided court of 4 to 3, the majority 
of the court holding that a provision such as we are now considering 
was unconstitutional, on the theory, that unaccrued installments of 
alimony were property. A careful consideration of the majority 
opinion reveals the fact that the court based its opinion that an 
award for alimony was property on other decisions of :the court 
dealing with judgments rendered for money consideration, which 
decisions, of course, were correct, as to the question there involved; 
in other words, the majority of the court apparently did not give 
any consideration to the fact that a judgment for alimony as to 
the unaccrued installments, stands upon an entirely different .basis 
and is of an entirely different character than judgments for a debt, 
on a note or account, or judgments for damages in tort actions 
where the creditor has the right to handle the same and to dispose 
of the same in any manner which he may desire. There is unques-
tionably a very decided difference between the ordinary judgment 
and an award for alimony, not only from the standpoint of the 
origin of the obligation but also from the standpoint of the right 
of disposition and extent of ownership. 
Justice O'Brien, who wrote the dissenting opinion, very clearly 
shows that an award for alimony does not constitute a property 
right because it does not have any of the attributes of property. 
In his opinion, at Page 127, among other things, he says: 
11 * *"The only other conceivable ground that the statute in 
question can be assailed as violative of the constitution 
must be that it deprives the plaintiff of her property with-
out due process of law. That contention implies that this 
incidental provision· in a judgment of divorce which the 
law and the court might grant or deny at pleasure is prop-
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erty. It cannot be sold or trans£ erred or bequeathed by 
will, or passed to next of kin in case of intestacy. It,ha§ 
no more of the attributes of property than the common 
law right to martial support, for which it is an imperfect 
substitute. It must be apparent that, from the general 
nature and character of alimony and its limitations, it is 
taken out of the general law of property. It is a creation 
of equity, and a statute that empowers courts of equity to 
administer it, or reduce or modify it as to amount or 
otherwise, as changed conditions and circumstances may 
require. In order to do equity between the parties, violates 
none of Jhe guaranties of the constitution for protection 
I 
of property." . 
Further, at Page 129, Justice O'Brien says: 
"It was held in that case that alimony, by reason of its 
nature and express limitations, was taken out of the gen-
eral law of property, and, as it was created by equity, it 
should have the protection of equity, so that it may not be 
perverted to a purpose for which it was not intended;, that 
alimony is incidental to a decree of divorce, in favor of 
the wife, and is simply the allowance for her support, and 
not a debt due to her from her husband, but a substitute 
for the marital obligation to support, from which the 
husband, because of his misconduct, is not relieved by the 
decree; the marital obligation is by the judgment made 
specific and measured by the court; and hence that a 
general duty of marital support, over which the husband 
had a discretionary control, had been changed into a 
specific duty." 
Again, Justice O'Brien, at Page 128, says: 
"The truth is that neither a marriage nor a judgment 
of divorce, or any of its incidents, is property, within the 
meaning of the constitution. Bishop on M. & D. sections 
1430, 1434. Nothing would seem to be more reasonable 
than the proposition that the state, which once exercised 
the power to grant divorce, with or without alimony, by 
special acts-a power which it coµld again . resume,-
has still power enough le£ t to enact the section of the 
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Code referred to as it now stands.· It may take the prop-
erty of the citizen by the taxing power to any extent. It 
may surround him with police regulations by day and by 
night that restrict his liberty and affect his property." 
12* *THE PUBLIC POLICY IN VIRGINIA ON 
THE QUESTION AT.ISSUE. 
The case of Livingston vs. Livingston was decided in 1903, and 
whatever may have been the public policy' in the State of New York 
at that time in regard to the courts having continual control over 
. the question of alimony, it is perfectly apparent from even a hasty 
consideration of Section 5111 and the several amendments thereto 
in recent years that the public policy in Virginia at this time is that 
the award of alimony shall be under the control of the court which 
awarded it, thruoghout the entire _period of its duration. 
In Virginia, it has been held that alimony is not a debt in the 
strict sense of that term, but it is. the obligation of the husband to 
support the wife, made specific. It has been fu,rther held that ali-
mony is a matter of public concern, and that an order for alimony 
is an order compelling the husband to support the wife. 
West vs. West, 126 Va. 696, 101 S. E. 876. 
Capell vs. Capell, 154 Va. 45; 178 S. E. 894. 
Casilear vs. Casilear, 168 Va. 46, 140 S. E. 314. 
The case of Isaacs vs. Isaacs, 117 Va. 730; -S. E.-. , and cases 
holding along the same line, do not, in any manner, militate against 
the position taken in this case by your petitioner, because it is 
recognized that those cases simply hold that the judgment for ali-
mony is a lien binding the property of the husband, and that 
12* the divorced wife occupies the position of a *creditor to the 
extent ot preserving said lien so that she may enforce her 
rights to said alimony when and as the same accrue. Those cases 
do not hold, nor even intimate, that unaccrued alimony installments 
constitute property which is protected by the constitution. 
The lower court, in his opinion, refers to the case of Golderos vs. 
Golderos, 169 Va. 496, as though it decides the question at issue, 
whereas it was the decision in· that case, as your petitioner is in-
formed, that caused the amendment to Section 5111 to be passed. 
The lower Court,. in his opinion, in citing the case of Brinn vs: 
Brinn, 147 Va. 2?7, refers to the case of Ruge vs. Ruge, and quotes 
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from the same to the effect of the finality of the decree for alimony, 
and also to the effect that said decree operates as res judicata upon 
the question of alimony. One only has to r.ead the portion of said 
quotation to see that the Cou,;t in the Ruge ca~e says: 
"The judgment or decree by its terms purporting to be 
final and conclusive upon the question, and there being no 
statute conferring upon the court the power to modtfy, 
there is no other source of authority to which we may 
look." 
It thm~ appears that that decision was rendere4 when there was no 
statute keeping the case before the Court, not was it consid-
14* *ering at the time of the decision a retroactive statute giving 
the court the power to inquire into unaccrtied installments 
of alimony; in other words, the Ruge case was decided under the 
same circumstances as the Golderos case, and of course neither can 
be of any authority on the question at issue. 
Your petitioner, for reasons heretofore assigned, respectfully sub-
mits that the aforesaid decree of July 20, 1939, is erroneous, and 
your petitioner prays that an appeal therefrom may be allowed, and 
a supersedeas thereto may be awarded, and that said decree may be 
reviewed, reversed, and set aside, and such. decree entered as will do . 
justice to your petitioner. 
Your petitioner adopts this, his petition, as his brief in this cause, 
and prays that it may be so read. 
. The undersigned counsel for petitioner desires to state orally the 
reasons for reviewing the decision above complained of, and asks 
that he may be notified of the time of the hearing. 
1 It is hereby certified that there was mailed on October 17th, 1939, 
to Wharton and Aldhizer, Attorneys for Henrietta V. Davis, at 
Harrisonburg, Virginia, a carbon copy of the foregoing petition, the 
said attorneys being the only opposing counsel appearing in the trial 
court in this cause. 
It is further hereby certified that the foregoing petition 
15* *for appeal will be forthwith filed with the Clerk of the 
Supreme Court of Appeals, at Richmond, Virginia. 
-p-_-_,-.Y-
18ft', 
GEO. S. HARNSBERGER, Couns~l. 
·· J: S. EATON, 
By Counsel. 
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I, Geo. S. Harnsberger, an attorney practicing in the Supreme 
Court of Appeals of Virginia, do certify that in my opinion there 
is error in the decrees complained of in the foregoing petition for 
the reasons therein set forth, and tl)at said decree should be re-
view<!d, reversed, and set aside. 
·Given under my hand this 17th day of October, 1939. 
GEO. S. HARNSBERGER, 
Harrisonburg, Virginia 
Received October 18, 1939. 
M. B. WATTS, Clerk. 
January 10, 1940. Appeal and supersedeas awarded by the court. 
Bond $300. 
RECORD 
STATE OF VIRGINIA, TO-WIT: 
M. B. W. 
· In the Office of the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Rockingham 
County, October 6, 1939. 
J. S. EATON, Complainant, 
v. IN-CHANCERY, 
HENRIETTA V. DA VIS, Defendant. 
BE IT REMEMBERED that heretofore, to-wit, at First August 
Rules, 1938, came the complainant by his attorney and filed in the 
Clerk's Office of said Court his bill in chancery in the words and 
figures following, to-wit : 
BILL. 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ROCKINGHAM COUNTY, 
. VIRGINIA. 
To the Hon. H. W. Bertram, Judge of said Court: 
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_Your complainant, J. S. Eaton, respectfully represents : 
'That this Court, by a decree entered .on July; 25, 1929, in the 
divorce suit of Henrietta V. Eaton vs. J. S. Eaton, adjudicated that 
the amount of alimony to be paid to Henrietta V. Davis,-
page 2 ~ she having re-taken her maiden name,-by your co~--
plainant, was $50.00 per month, payable on the first day 
of each month. 
An attested .copy of said decree is herewith filed, marked "Ex. 
Decree," and the same is prayed to be read as a part hereof. 
That said alimony has been paid to July 1, 1938. 
That, at the time said decree was entered, to-wit, July 25, 1929, 
the right to thereafter modify said .decree was dependent upon the 
reservation of such right. · 
That the injustice worked by such a law became so apparent in 
1934 that the Legislature of that year amended Virginia Code Sec-
tion 5111, amongst other ways, as follows: "and upon petition of 
either party may increase, decrease, or cause to cease, any alimony, 
as the circumstances may make proper." 
That, in order to clarify the meaning of "any alimony," the 
Legislature of 1938 again amended Section 5111 by adding immedi- · · 
ately after the words "any alimony," the following: "that may 
thereafter accrue whether the same has been heretofore or hereafter 
awarded." 
That the last amendment to said Section 5111 gives the right 
to either party to apply for the reduction of alimony whenever the 
same may have been awarded, and thus said section as to the 
reduction of alimony was made retroactive. 
That the said Act of 1938 became effective June 21, 1938. 
That, since said decree of July 25, 1929, the financial 
page 3 ~ and physical condition of your complainant has undergone 
a radically downward decline, in this, to-wit: 
( 1) The store building at the corner of Spotswood and Stuart 
Avenues in w}lich your complainant was doing a fair business in 
1929 has been sold from him, and his mercantile business has been 
entirely destroyed. 
(2) A number. of his other properties have been sold in order to 
raise money with which to pay alimony to respondent. 
( 3) Your complainant, in 1929, was able to work and did work 
at anything that he could get to do, but now your complainant is 
broken in health, has just recently returned from an extended stay 
and treatment· at The Rockingham Memorial Hospital, and is not 
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now apl~ to do manual labor, nor is he qualified in any other way 
to earn a livelihood. 
( 4) That your complainant is now in a destitute condition. 
( 5) That the following properties remain in your complainant's 
• name, to-wit : 
(a) The Bockey property, which is situate on the Elk 
· Run Road; 
(b) The Farrar property, which is situate on Hill 
Avenue; 
( c) The Tompkins property, situate on Rockingham 
Street; 
( d) The Baugher property, situate on Spotswood 
Aveni,e; 
page 4 ~ ( e) The Jennings and Moose lots, situate between 
Spotswood A venue and Rockingham Street.. 
That all of the properties listed under (a), ( b), ( c), and ( d), 
supra, are in bad need of repair, and have greatly depreciated in 
value; that all of said properties have been sold to ,the Common-
we~lth for delinquent taxes, and the liens resting thereon are for 
more than their present value. 
(6) That Henrietta V. Davis has been paid, since the divorce 
decree in 1928, alimony to the approximate value of $6,000.00. 
That she is now the owner of said store building at the corner 
of Spotswood and Stuart Av~nues. 
That she is apparently in good health, and much more able to 
make a living than your complainant. 
(7) That your complainant is advised and alleges that she has a 
right to file this, his bill of complaint, which, under Virginia Code 
Section 5111 as amended, is to be treated as a petition in the said 
divorce suit of Henrietta V. Davis vs. J. S. Eaton; that he has a 
right to have the installments of alimony, beginning July 1, 1938, 
drastically reduced, so that the same may be in keeping with his 
financial condition at the present time. 
Your complaint therefore prays that Henrietta V. Davis may be 
made a party defendant to this suit; that process may· issue; that 
she may be required to answer the bill of complaint, answer under 
oath being waived; that said bill of complaint may be 
page 5 ~ treated and r:ead as petition in the divorce suit of Hen-
rietta V. Davis vs. J. S. Eaton; that the amount of ali-
mony as to the installments beginning July 1, 1938, may be drasti-
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cally reduced for the reasons hereinabove given, and that your com-
plainant may have such other, further, and general relief as the 
nature of the case may require, or to Equity may seem meet. Abd, 
as in duty bound, he will ever pray, etc. 
GEO. S. HARNSBERGER, Counsel. 
(Signed) J. S. EATON, 
By Counsel. 
"EXHIBIT DECREE." 
This day came the petitioner, J. S. Eaton, by his counsel, and the 
defendant, Henrietta V. Davis, upon whom process has been duly 
executed, likewise came, by her counsel, and, on their motion, and 
by leave of Court, this cause was thereupon duly docketed; where-
upon this cause came on this 25th day of July, 1929, to be heard 
upon process duly executed upon the said defendant; and upon the 
petition of J. S. Eaton, this day filed in open Court by leave of 
Court first obtained; upon the answer of the said defendant this day 
filed in open court by leave of Court first obtained, '\yith general 
replication thereto ; upon the depositions taken and read in this 
cause upon behalf of both the petitioner and the defend- , 
page 6 ~ ant, and was argued by counsel. 
Upon consideration whereof, the Court doth reduce 
the amount of the alimony heretofore ordered by the decree entered 
in the cause of Henrietta V. Eaton vs. J. S. Eaton on the 13th day 
of March, 1928, to be paid by J. S. Eaton to Henrietta V. Eaton, 
from the sum of $60.00 per month, as therein directed to be paid, 
to the sum of $50.00 per month, and it is, therefore, ADJUDGED, 
ORDERED, AND DECREED that the said J. S. Eaton pay unto 
the said Henrietta V. Davis, as alimony, but not in any event for a 
longer period than their joint lives, for the maintenance of Hen ... 
rietta V. Davis, the sum of fifty dollars per month on the 1st day 
of each month ; and it is further ordered that this decree shall apply 
to the installment of alimony due July 1, 1929. It is further 
ADJUDGED,' ORDERED, AND DECREED that the costs at-
tendant upon said petition shall be paid by the said J. S. Eaton. 
Whereupon J. S. Eaton, by counsel, moved the Court to reserve 
the right at any time hereafter to modify the alimony herein decreed 
to be paid and the terms of its payment so as to meet conditions of 
the parties as the same may change from time to time in the future, 
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as the Court had done in the former orders heretofore entered in 
connection with this matter, but the Court doth overrule said 
motion and orders said petition stricken from the docket of the 
court. 
page 7 ~ DEMURRER AND ANSWER OF 
HENRIETTA V. DAVIS. 
This respondent, Henrietta V. Davis, demurs to' the bill of com-
plaint of J. S. Eaton and for grounds of said demurrer says: 
FIRST: That said bill is not sufficient in law and equity. 
SECOND: That as appears from the allegations in said bill, the · 
complainant's right to the relief prayed for in said bill is based on 
the 1938 amendment to the Virginia Code Section 5111, which 
reads as follows : 
" .. and upon petition of either party may increase, 
decrease, or cause to cease any alimony that may there-
after accrue, whether the same has- been heretofore or 
hereafter awarded as the circumstances may make 
proper." 
An allowance of the remedy prayed for would ~e tantamount to 
setting aside the final judgment rendered in this court on July 25, 
1929. This court has no jurisdiction, as a final judgment has been 
rendered fixing the alimony that J. S. Eaton was to pay Henrietta 
V. Davis. The Legislature of Virginia can not pass a constitutional 
act setting aside or allowing a rehearing on a final judgment, such 
as entered by this court on July 25, 1929, as shown by a copy of 
the same filed by Complainant along with his bill marked "Exhibit 
Decree." 
. And not waiving the said demurrer, but insisting thereon, for 
answer to said bill or so much thereof as she is advised it 
page 8 ~ is necessary for her to answer, your respondent says: 
That she denies that cornplainant is no longer financially 
able to pay alimony of $50.00 per month, and states further that if 
complainant has suffered any financial reverses ~ince July 25, 1929, 
the losses he sustained, if any, were losses or expenditures brought 
about by his persistent, dogmatic attempts to evade the payment of 
alimony as awarded under said decree and that his losses have been 
expenditures of court costs, attorneys feets, etc., he sustained in and 
about attempting to evade said order. 
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That since the entering of said decree, complainant has remarried 
and is maintaining the satne standard of living as he ~lways has, and 
seems to have rnoney for everything except the payment of alimol)y. 
Your respondent denies that complainant is not able to work, and 
says that he is now working and has been working for some time, 
and denies that complainant has the right to have his alimony re-
duced. 
Respondent further states that she has no means or income what-
soever; that she is greatly advanced in years and in poor health and 
is unable to make a living, that she has no income or income pro-
ducing property. And now having fully answered this respondent 
, therefore prays that sne be hence dismissed with her costs in this 
matter expended. 
Dated September 30, 1938. 
(Signed) HENRIETTA V. DAVIS, 
By Counsel. 
WHARTON & ALDHIZER, Of Counsel. 
page 9 ~ ORDER FILING DEMURRER. 
/ 
On motion of Henrietta V. Davis, by counsel, leave is this day 
given her to file her demurrer and answer in this cause, and the 
same is accordingly filed this 30th day of September, 1938. 
ORDER OF COURT ENTERED JULY 20, 1939. 
This cause came on this 20th day of July, 1939, to be heard upon 
the bill of complaint and the exhibit therewith filed, process duly 
executed upon the party defendant, upon the demurrer filed to the 
said bill of complaint by Henrietta V. Davis and the joinder therein 
by complainant, cause set for hearing and was argued by counsel : 
Upon consideration whereof and the Court being of the opinion, 
-for reasons stated in writing and hereby made a part of this dectee 
as tho set .forth herein,-;--that said demurrer is well taken, doth so 
adjudge, order and decree, and said demurrer is hereby sustained, 
and said bill of complaint is hereby dismissed at th'e cost of com-
plainant. 
page 10 ~ OPINION OF COURT. 
On Demurrer. 
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Complainant by his Bill seeks to be relieved in part of the burden 
of the decree of July 25, 1929, entered by this court against him in 
favor of the defendant, here, who brought the suit wherein said 
decree was rendered. By that decree he was required to pay defend-
ant, as permanent alimony, the sum of $50.00 per month, beginning 
July 1, 1929. The Bill alleges that he has paid all installments 
falling to July 1, 1938, and prays that the amount of alimony 
accruing thereafter be "drastically reduced," for reasons assigned. 
He relies upon the amendment to Code Section 5111 made in 1938, 
for the right to maintain his Bill, which reads as follows : " . . and 
upon petition of either -party may increase, decrease, or cause to 
cease any alimony that may thereafter accrue, whether th.e same 
has been heretofore or hereaf fer awarded,, as the circumstances may 
make proper." (The underscored portion is the whole of the amend-
ment, the other portion of the quotatfon appearing in the amend-
ment of 1934.) 
Defendapt, here, files her demurrer and assigns as grounds: 
1. The bill is not sufficient in law or in equity. 
2. "That an allowance of the remedy prayed for would be tanta-
mount to setting aside the final judgment rendered·in this 
page 11 ~ court on July 25, 1929 (above. referred to). This court 
has no jurisdiction, as a final judgment has been rendered 
fixing the alimony that J. S. Eaton was to pay ... The legislature .. 
cannot pass a court's testimonial constitutional act setting aside or 
allowing a rehearing on a final judgment, such as entered by this 
court on July 25, 1929 ... " , 
The question involved here depends upon whether or not the said 
decree fixing alimony established a vested right in defendant, h.ere; 
and whether the said act of the Legislature is a valid exercise of the 
legislative power so far as its retrospective provision is concerned. 
In Kenned)' Coal v. Buck'n Co_al 140 Va. 37 the court defined a 
vested right "as a right so fixed that it is not dependent on any 
futur~ act, contingency or decision to make it more sure." 
In that case as in this the question presented was whether or 
not an Act of the General Assembly was. a valid exer~ise of the 
legislative power. In the course of the opinion, the court, after 
quoting the following from opinion of Judge Buchanan in case of 
Martin vs. South Salem Land Co. 94 Va. 36. "The Legislature, 
within certain limitations, may alter and construe remedies by 
which litigants assert their rights in the courts, but when the litiga-
tion has proceeded to judgment or decree upon the merits of the 
controversy, it has passed beyond its powers" said: "That is to say, 
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the legislature is without power to devest one of a constitutional 
right" and further siad : "If they ( appellees) have by 
page 12 ~ virtue of the decree acquired a vested right, it must be 
concluded that the statute . . is repugnant to Section 11 
of the Constitution of Virginia, which provides in part 'that no 
person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law'; 
and that it also violates Article 58 of the Constitution of·Virginia 
as to the impairment of the obligation of a contract." 
The decree of July 25, 1929, here complained. of was and is 
certainly a decree upon the merits, rendered after a bitter and pro-
longed litigation, both as to the right of complainant, there, to a 
divorce and the amount of alimony decreed·to be paid her. 
But counsel for complainant argues that a decree for alimony "is 
not a property right but a right to maintenance and support made 
specific by the decree for alimony" and therefore "the Legislature 
of Virginia was fully within its power to so amend Section 5111 of 
the Code as to make its provisions i,.i regard to the alteration, reduc-
tion, or elimination of alimony apply retroactively to any award 
theretofore made" ; and insists that since all the authorities cited 
by counsel for demurrant are based upon the consideration by the 
courts that a decree for alimony is a property right and not a mere 
personal claim for maintenance and support ( as contended in the 
minority opinion in the New York case of Livfogston v. Livingston, 
cited and quoted from by counsel for demurrant) ; this court should 
hold that the said decree complained of created no vested right in 
demurrant and therefore the retrospective portion of the , 
.. page 13 ~ statute is a valid exercise of the legislative power and 
violates no constitutional right of demurrant; contending 
further that while there are no Virginia cases directly on the ques-
tion, the expressions of the Virginia Court of Appeals on collateral 
or rather ~orrelated questions involving alimony, indicate that said 
court will not hold that a decree for alimony is a vested right. This, 
I think epitomises his contention. 
In Isaacs v. Isaac~ 117 Va. 730, the court held that a decree for 
alimony payable in monthly installments during the lifetime of the 
beneficiary constitutes a lien upon all the husband's real estate from 
the date of the decree not only for instalments presently due, but 
for those that shall fall due under such decree; and when a tem-
porary decree for alimony is subsequently made permanent, the 
lien for the whole amount dates back to the entry of the temporary 
decree and takes priority over. subsequent judgments against the 
husband or liens created by him. 
22 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
In the case of West v. West 126 Va. 696, the court said: "As a 
result of that marriage and condonation, he ( the husband) incurred 
responsibilities from which he cannot and should not escape. Among 
those responsibilities are his duty, under Code, 1919, Sec. 5107, to 
pay sums necessary for the maintenance of the woman and to enable 
her to carry on her suit, and under section 5111 to pay such proper 
permanent alimony upon the dissolution of the marriage as the 
court may decree." 
"It has sometimes been claimed that because imprison-
page 14 ~ ment for debt has been abolished, therefore, a court of 
equity cannot commit to jail for failure to pay alimony. 
The true doctrine, however, is that a decree for alimony is essen-
tially different from an ordinary debt or j~1dgment for money. 
It is an allowance in the nature of a partition of the husband's prop-
. erty, of which the wife is entitled to a reasonable share for her 
maintenance. It is an order compelling the husband to support his 
wife, and this is a public as well as a marital duty-a moral as well 
as a legal obligation. The liability is not based upon a contract to 
pay money, but upon the refusal to perform a duty. The imprison-
ment is not ordered simply to enforce the payment of money, but 
to punish for the wilful disobedience of a proper order of a court 
of competent jur_isdiction." 
I have made this full quotation so that the meaning intended by 
the court to be given the several phrases, clauses and sentences may 
be better understood. I have underscored for purpose of pointing 
out the significance of the language used so far as it relates to the 
question here at issue. In that opinion the court did not say that a 
decree for alimony is not a debt or a judgment for the payment of 
money, but that such decree is essentially different from an ordinary 
debt, etc., and because of this difference courts may commit the 
debtor husband to jail for failure to pay, as a punish.ment for a 
wilful disobedience of an order of a court of competent juris-
diction. While the decree may be in the nature of a partition of the 
husband's property, it is nevertheles? a judgment for the 
.Page 15 ~ payment of money, which judgment is a lien upon the 
husband's real estate and may be enforced as other liens 
are enforced. 1 R. C. L. 951-Bra.:v v. Landergren 161 Va. 699; 
Isaacs vs. Isaacs supra. 
·The. case of Casilear vs. Casilear, 168 Va. p. 46 is cited by coun-
sel for plaintiff as authority for the proposition that the "court's 
power to award· ·alimony is incidental, inherent and express, and 
cannot be ousted by an agreement which the court itself does not 
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adopt ~nd approve." The case of Capell v. Capell 164 Va. 45 is 
also cited as authority: "That a decree for alimony 'is an order 
compelling a husband to support his wife, and this is a public as 
well as a marital duty-a moral as well as a legal obligation'," and 
"It is not founded on contract, express om implied, but on the 
natural and legal duty of the husband to support the wife. The 
general obligation to support is made specific by the decree of the 
court of appropriate jurisdiction." 
I see nothing in either of these quotations, nor in the opinion to 
indicate that the court looked upon a final decree for permanent 
alimony as not conferring a right of property in the wife to the 
alimony decreed. The first suit was on a decree for divorce a nie11sa 
and temporary alimony and cause held on the docket. The other 
was a proceeding on a rule against the husband for -failure to pay 
permanent alimony allowed under final decree granting a divorce 
a vinculo, and the case retired from the docket; but that portion of 
· the decree relating to the amount and payment of alimony 
page 16 ~ should be "so long as both shall live, or until· further 
ordered by this court," the court thus retaining jurisdic-
tion as it had a right to do, so as .to be empowered to modify its 
decree as to alimony to meet the changed conditions of the parties. 
The question .for determination was whether provision for sup-
port in a decree were superseded by ~ contract afterwards made, 
and if so, had these parties power to make such a contract in pais. · 
The court held that "the power of a trial court in Virginia to award 
alimony is incidental, inherent and express ( citing other decisions 
and Sec. 5111). "After final decree it has power to retain juris-
diction to enter such other orders dealing therewith as it may appear 
necessary and proper. That power in the instant case, was expressly 
retained. 
"Because it was retained and because it touches a public as well 
as a marital duty, jurisdiction cannot be ousted by an agreement 
between the parties in pais which the court ifself does not adopt and 
approve." · 
Is not this equivalent to saying that, when the court has, by its 
decree, granted a divorce a v-inculo and fixed the amount of alimony 
to be paid the wife and surrendered further jurisdiction by failing 
or refosing to include in the decree a retention of power to further 
deal with the question of alimony, the right of the wife to enjoy all 
benefits granted by such decree-both the divorce and the alimony-
. has become so fixed and not dependent on any future act, 
24 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
page 17 ~ contingency or decision to make it more sure, as to place 
it within the class of vested rights? 
The case of Golderos v. Golder.os, 169 Va. 496 is one where the 
question involved was "the power of a court of equity to sub-
.sequently modify and change the alimony provisions of a final 
cjecree of divorce from bonds of matrimony where there were no 
children to be provided for, and no reservation was made for future 
changes or modifications." 
Final decree granting the divorce, fixing the alimony and retiring 
the case from the docket was entered October, 1930. On December 
11, 1933, the wife gave legal consent "to husband to reduce alimony 
from $75 to $50 per· month, commencing January 1, 1934. On 
· May 9, 1934, the trial court entered a decree· in the original cause, 
undertaking to vacate so much of the first decree as directed pay-
ment of $75 per month and reduce payments to $50 per month. 
Again on June 18, 1936, the court over objection of the plaintiff 
entered ~ decree reducing the amount of alimoney to $25 per 
month. On December 8, 1936, the cause was heard and a nunc 
pro tune decree entered restoring the case to the docket and con-
fir01ing all decrees previously entered. . 
. Now it will be noted that on March 29, 1934, with an emergency 
~lause attached, the legislature amended and re-enacted Code Sec. 
5111, incorporating therein as part of the amendment: "and tipon 
· · petition of either party may increase, decrease or cause to cease, any 
alimony, as the circumstances may make proper." The 
·page 18 ~ amendment of 1938 was·by inserting after "any alimony" 
· the words "that may thereafter accrue whether the same 
has heretofore or hereafter awarded." 
The case was decided January 13, 1938. 
The court denied the power and in course of the opinion said: 
"The de_cree of divorce entered on October 9, 1930, .became final 
upon the adjournment of the Court for that term. The trial court 
had heard and determined the. case on its merits. It had had the 
opportunity to exercise all of the powers it possessed, both in grant-
ing the divorce and in determining the amount of alimony which 
should be paid to the wife. The question of alimony was, in fact, 
actually litigated, and definitely and finally determined. No reserva-
tion was made of the power to change or modify the terms of the 
decree to meet a changed condition of the parties, which might 
. subsequently occur .... There was, at that time, ( decree of October 
1930) no statute conferring the power to modify or alter sue~ a 
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decree! There was left to the court only the right to enforce obedi-
ence to it. 
"After the decree became final, the parties were no longer mar-
ried. The trial court had no other jurisdiction arising out of the 
marital relation except to compel compliance with the provisions of 
the decree. The right to award the alimony in this case arose out 
of the jurisdiction of the court in the divorce proceeding. The 
power to which the award of alimony was incidental, ceased to exis~ 
when the decree became final. Certainly the cause could 
page 19 ~ not be opened for the purpose of modifying the character 
of the divorce thereto granted, nor could such jurisdiction 
be reinstated to secure power to perform an incidental purpose. If 
it could be reopened for one purpose, it might be reopened for all 
purposes." 
In that case, n·otwithstanding the decrees of May 9, 1934, and 
June 18, 1930, were entered after the amendment of 1934 to the 
statute became effective, yet the court considered and applied the 
statute only as it was at the time of the entry of the decree of 
October, 1930. 
Certainly the court, in that case must have looked upon the decree 
of October 1930 as having established such estate in and to the 
alimony decreed to be paid, as to prevent the decree from being 
changed or altered in any way, otherwise it would appear that after 
the 1934 amendment, the question of alteration could have been 
considered at the time of the entry of the decrees of June 18, 1936, 
and December 8, 1936. 
17 Am. Jur. p. 410. 
While marriage in the eye of the law, is a civil contract, its 
consequences .. are of such vital importance to the body politic that 
the state, irrespective of the wishes of the parties thereto, imposes 
upon them a duty to have dµe regard for its interests· therein. Con-
sequently, alimony is founded not so much on the express or implied 
terms of the contract of marriage, as on the natural and legal 
duty of a husband to support his wife; it is an obligation, the 
enforcement of which is of such vital concern to the state 
page 20 ~ itself that the law will not permit him to terminate it by· 
his own wrongful act in driving her to seek a legal sep-
aration or divorce. A decree for alimony, therefore is not due and 
payable either as damages or as a penalty; nor is it a qebt in the 
strict legal sense of the term, but rather a judgment calling for the 
performance of a duty made specific by the decree of a court 
of competent jurisdiction. Therefore, a constitutional prohibition 
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against imprisonment for debt does not preve1:1t a commitment for 
non-payment of alimony, although, so far as other methods of 
enforcement are concerned, the wife is generally considered a judg-
?11,ent creditor of her husband to the extent of being entitled to all 
the remedies given by statute to such creditors." · 
There is nothing here which ta~es a .final decree for permanent 
alimony out of the class of vested property rights. 
In the case of Brinn v. Brinn, 147 Va. 277, the question was, 
whether, in the absence of any ·reservation in the decree and of a 
statute authorizing it, a court of equity has the power to modify a 
final decree awarding a divorce from the bond of matrimony, and 
decreeing alimony in monthly instalments. This was answered in 
the negative. Judge Burke, in his opinion, saying: "On this question 
the authorities are not in harmony, but the weight of authority 
and the better reasoning, we think, denies the power," and, after 
quoting from Ruge v. Ritge, 97 Wash. 51, further says: 
page 21 ~ "We concur in the conclusion reached in Ruge v. Ruge, 
supra, that the decree cannot be modified in the case pro-
pounded in this question." 
In the quotation from the Ruge case it is said in part : "The 
question, may decrees in this class of cases be modified, seems to 
carry its own answer. The status to which the power to award 
alimony is incident having by judicial mandate ceased to exist, the 
court having exe~cised all the power in the premises that it pos-
sessed, there being no continuing relationship of parent and child to 
which the power to modify may be refused, the alimony in question 
involving the right of the wife only, the judgment or decree by its 
terms purporting to he final and conclusive upon the question, and 
there being no sfa.tute conferring upon the court the power to 
modify, there is no other source of authority to which we may 
look. ... "We must disabuse our minds of the thought that there 
is an3, peculiar mystery atta.clied to decrees of divorce and aliniony, 
merely because they are such .... It is elementary that an adjudica-
tion by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the 
parties is final mzd conclusive, not only as to the matters actually 
determined, but as to every other matter which the parties ought to 
have litigated as incident thereto and coming within the legitimate 
purview of the subject matter of the action, consequently, when 
the question of alimony is actually litigated and finally determined, 
in the divorce action, as it is in this class of cases, a judgment or 
decree in the action operates as res judicata upon the question of 
alimony. . . . " ( underscoring mine) . 
I 
I 
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page 22 ~ Quoting directly from Brinn opinion : "When power 
is reserved over a decree for alimony, to that extent, but 
to that extent only, the decree fixing the amount is not final. The 
reservation itself shows that the court has not completely and 
finally exhausted its jurisdiction over that sul:i}ect." ' 
The declaration in the Brinn opinion that: "We must disabuse 
our minds of the thought that there is any peculiar mystery attached 
to decrees of divorce and alimony merely because they are such" 
unquestionably completely refutes any argument that a final and 
conclusive decree for the payment of permanent alimony does not 
confer a property right in the beneficiary thereof, just as all other 
judgments for the payment of money. 
Considering now decisions in ·other jurisdictions. 
In the New York case of Livingston vs. Livingston cited by 
counsel for Petitioner, and found in 66 N. E. at page 123, the 
majority opinion as reflected by ·Sections 2 and 3, of the syllabus, 
it was held: · 
(2) "Where defendant in a divorce is adjudged to pay a certain 
sum annually for the plaintiff's support and that of her children, it 
creates substantial rights, which constitute property of the plaintiff, 
of which she cannot be deprived without due process of law." 
( 3_) "Laws 1900, c. 742, permitting the court, on application of 
either party to an action of divorce, at any time after final judg-. 
ment, "whether heretofore or hereafter rendered, to annul, 
page 23 ~ vary or modify" a direction of a judgment of divorce 
requiring defendant to provide for the support of plaintiff, 
and for the education and maintenance of the children of the parties, 
is unconstitutional, in so far as it attempts to confer a power on 
the court to annul or vary valid and final judgments entered before 
the passage of the act. 
In the course of the opinion it was said: 
I-Relative to the argument that provision for alimony "does 
not constitute a vested right belonging to the wife" -"it seems to 
me, that in such an argument, sight is utterly lost of the nature of 
the decree awarding alimony, or of the right which accrues to the 
wife as the result of an adjudication by the court, when, in divorc-
ing the parties from their respective martial obligations, it fix~s the 
alimony to be paid by the husband. The marriage relation has been 
terminated by the decree. The wife has no future rights, and the 
husband is under no future obligations such as are founded upon 
or spring out of the marriage relation." 
2-"The judgment in this case, in determining that, for cause, 
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the marriage should be dissolved, also determined with equal final-
ity that the defendant, while released from the general· duty of 
liability which he had been under, should pay a fixed sum during 
the plaintiff's life, can it reasonably be doubted. that a right was 
vested in the plaintiff to the receipt of the annual sums which 
the judgment adjudged the defendant should pay? ... 'The plain-
' · tiff prior to the decree had a right of support. By her 
page 24 ~ divorce she lost that right, and in substitution for it, 
acquired a new right-a judgment requiring the payment 
to her of a specific amount of money. That right, as a vested 
interest, is property, which the legislature is powerless to divest 
her of. If the interest is, as it is claimed, an expectant one, in the 
sense that the obligation of the defendant was a continuing one to 
pay alimony in the future, nevertheless the interest was one fixed 
by the judgment, and was not a mere contingency. It was not a 
capacity to acquire a right to the payment of money. It was· a 
right fixed by judgment, and hence vested in the plaintiff." 
3-"In the State of Louisiana v. Mayor of New Orleans. *( 109 
U. S. 285) where it is held that a judgment of damages recovered 
for a tort was not a contract, in the constitutional sense, Mr. Justice 
Bradley, in his opinion, takes occasion to say of it that it is founded 
upon an absolute right, and is as much an article of property as 
anything else that a party owns, and the legislature can no more 
violate it, without due process of law, than it can other property'." 
I have quoted so extensively from the opinion in the Livingston 
case not only because that case is so directly in point in facts and 
law to the case before me for decision, but beec_mse the reasoning 
of that court seems to me sound in reasoning and ultimate finding, 
notwithstanding the very able dissenting opinion relied upon by 
plaintiff, here, as authority in support of his contention. 
I have also quoted extensively from several of the Vir-
page 25 ~ ginia cases in order that the reasonings in those cases, on 
questions different from but somewhat related to the 
question here under consideration, may appear to be applicable to 
this case. 
As recognized by the Virginia decision,· alimony has its origin in 
the natural and legal obligation of the husban~, incident to the 
marriage, to maintain and support his wife; is founded on that 
obligation and not upon contract; and that general obligations may 
be made specific by a decree of a court of appropriate jurisdiction. 
But whatever may be the foundation of such decree and· however 
it may essentially differ from the ordinary judgment for the pay-. 
J. S. Eaton vs. Henrietta V. Davis. 29 
ment of money, it still remains a judgment for the payment of 
money and like any other judgment for the payment of money vests 
a property right thereto in the judgment beneficiary. It is the 
judgment which confers the vested right, not the original obliga-
tion of the husband to support the wife, which obligation furnishes 
only the basis of the decree-the original right to support is lost 
and merged into the decree granting an absolute divorce and fixing 
alimony. After a careful consideration of the authorities cited, my· 
conclusion is that the demurrer must be and it is, sustained, and the 
.Bill dismissed. Because the decree of July 25, 1929, cdmplained of 
finally and conlusively vested in the defendant here, ... right to the 
fruits of that decree and cannot now be constitutionally affected by 
the retrospective provision of Code Section 5111 as it now stands 
under the amendment of 1938, upon which provision the Bill is 
solely based. 
7 /5/39. H. W. BERTRAM, Judge. 
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